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Operation Windsor never seemed to fit. Why, one asks, would the 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division launch a major operation to 
seize Carpiquet village and airfield a mere four 
days before I British Corps started the much 
larger three-division Operation Charnwood to 
seize Caen? It seemed a distraction from the 
main effort – a needless diversion of resources. 
This view was reinforced by the standard 
interpretations of the battles as reflected in 
the two introductory quotations: Windsor as a 
prelude to Charnwood. I had succumbed to what 
I will call the black box syndrome. I looked only 
within the analytical framework established by 
countless historians from C.P. Stacey to Terry 
Copp3 to John A. English, and, like them, saw 
Operation Windsor as a precursor to Operation 
Charnwood. It was upon visiting the battlefield 
in 1997 and 1998 with the Canadian Battlefields 
Foundation student study tour that I gained a 
more complete understanding of the battle. For it 
is only on the field itself that one can understand 
that Operation Windsor had very little to do with 
Operation Charnwood, and so much more to 
do with Operations Epsom and Jupiter. Epsom 
is familiar to any scholar of the campaign, but 
Operation Jupiter, the 43rd Wessex Division 
attack on Hill 112, is more obscure. It was the 
ground that showed me the link which was 
reinforced by a close review of the I British Corps 
operations log. In this article I will try and show 
that the traditional interpretation of Operation 
Windsor has suffered from a “Canada-centric” 
bias that fails to relate the ground to the battle 
and assumes that all that precedes Charnwood 
must be setting the stage for that battle. First 
a review of the traditional interpretation is 
required.
 Traditional interpretations of the 4 July 
1944 battle for Carpiquet airfield, known as 
Operation Windsor, have linked the battle with 
Operation Charnwood, which followed the action 
at Carpiquet four days later. [For the details of 
Operation Windsor, see the shaded box on the 
next page.] Windsor seems pointless, particularly 
as the 8th Brigade captured the remaining 
objectives of Operation Windsor with relative ease 
on 8-9 July, the same objectives it was unable 
to seize on 4 July. Why was the 4 July battle 
necessary? Some interpretations imply it was a 
wasted effort and that the entire area could have 
waited until 8-9 July to be captured with little 
effect on the greater battle for Caen. This is the 
interpretation of Terry Copp and Robert Vogel 
in Maple Leaf Route: Caen, for example. They 
state that “It is not clear why General Crocker, 
who was to command Carnwood, ordered the 
3rd Canadian Division to capture Carpiquet 
before the main attack.”4 Furthermore, although 
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“1 British Corps had ordered 3rd Canadian Division to take both the airfield and 
Carpiquet village as a prelude to…a three-divisional assault directly on Caen.”1
“As a preliminary, the 3rd Canadian Division would attack on 3 July [sic] to secure 
Carpiquet airfield and the approaches to Caen from the west.”2
© Canadian Military History, Volume 17, Number 2, Spring 2008, pp.66-74.
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acknowledging the efforts of the 43rd Wessex 
Division that coincided with Operation Windsor, 
they do not extend that link to the subsequent 
assault by the West Country troops in Operation 
Jupiter on 10 July. John A. English, for his part, 
is very critical of the conduct of the battle and 
in particular the failure of Major-General R.F.L. 
Keller, commander of 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division, to involve himself more closely in the 
planning and execution of the assault. He does 
not challenge the received wisdom that the 
battle was a prelude to Charnwood, focused, 
as his study is, on the nature of command in 
the Canadian army in the Normandy campaign. 
Michael Reynolds, in his hagiographic study of 
the I SS Panzer Corps, is more concerned with 
the stand of a small force of panzergrenadiers 
against the firepower of the Allied army than in 
any examination of the reasons for the operation: 
“It was considered to be an essential prerequisite 
to the capture of Caen itself,” Reynolds asserts. 5 
Reginald Roy in his 1984 study of the Normandy 
campaign maintains this link to Charnwood 
but also introduces another motive, that of 
acquiring the airfield at Carpiquet.6 This reason, 
though valid on D-Day when Carpiquet airfield 
was indeed an objective of the 3rd Canadian 
Division, had by D+30 been largely overtaken by 
the construction of airfields in France.7 Finally, 
the recent study of the operations of the North 
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Eighth Brigade, strengthened by the addition of the Royal 
Winnipeg Rifles, was to attack 
with the support of 21 regiments 
of artillery, the tanks of the Fort 
Garry Horse, and three squadrons 
of Flails, Crocodiles and Petards 
from the 79th Armoured Division. 
Two squadrons of Typhoons and 
HMS Rodney’s 16-inch guns were 
used to soften up the target before 
the attack. All of this additional 
firepower made for an impressive 
barrage, but it did not prevent the 
Germans, who had every square 
yard of the area plotted for artillery 
fire, from wreaking havoc with 
the infantry. The four battalions 
had to cross more than a mile of 
open country. When Allied artillery 
opened up at 0500 hours on July 
4th the Germans instantly shelled 
the startline and continued to rain 
down high explosives on the men 
who struggled forward through the 
wheat fields.
 The North Shore regimental 
history calls Carpiquet “the 
graveyard of the regiment” 
because the battalion sustained 
its heaviest casualties of the 
war on July 4th. But the North 
Shores were lucky compared to 
the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. The 
Winnipegs had suffered so many 
losses on D-Day and in Putot that 
their casualties on July 4th, which 
were almost as high as the North 
Shores, were just another horror 
to be endured.
 Reading the war diaries 
and after-battle narratives of the 
survivors of Carpiquet is a chilling 
experience. Major J.E. Anderson 
of the North Shores spoke for 
everyone when he wrote,
I am sure that at some time 
during the attack every man 
felt he could not go on. Men 
were being killed or wounded 
on all sides and the advance 
seemed pointless as well as 
hopeless. I never realised until 
the attack on Carpiquet how 
far discipline, pride of unit, and 
above all, pride in oneself and 
family, can carry a man even 
when each step forward meant 
possible death.
 The men of the assault 
regiments did keep going forward. 
The North Shores and the 
Chaudières occupied Carpiquet 
village and dug in. They were 
joined by the Queen’s Own Rifles, 
who were supposed to press on 
Operation Windsor – an overview
Carpiquet village and airfield photographed 
one day after Operation “Windsor.” Fires 
still burn in the village and the damage 
caused by the attack is readily visible. The 
south hangars were the objective of the 
Royal Winnipeg Rifles. Le Régiment de 
la Chaudière captured the north hangars 
while the North Shore (New Brunswick) 
Regiment secured the village. The Queen’s 
Own Rifles, in reserve, joined the North 
Shores with the intention of advancing to 
the control buildings, but this attack was 
called off.    
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A Sherman tank of the Fort Garry Horse at 
Carpiquet, 8 July 1944.
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Canadian troops examine a German bunker 
on the airfield at Carpiquet, 12 July 1944.
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Carpiquet village and airfield photographed 
one day after Operation “Windsor.” Fires 
still burn in the village and the damage 
caused by the attack is readily visible. The 
south hangars were the objective of the 
Royal Winnipeg Rifles. Le Régiment de 
la Chaudière captured the north hangars 
while the North Shore (New Brunswick) 
Regiment secured the village. The Queen’s 
Own Rifles, in reserve, joined the North 
Shores with the intention of advancing to 
the control buildings, but this attack was 
called off.    
A Sherman tank of the Fort Garry Horse at 
Carpiquet, 8 July 1944.
to the airport control buildings. 
But the Royal Winnipeg Rifles 
had been unable to capture 
their objectives, the hangars on 
the south side of the runways. 
Here the Germans had waited in 
concrete pillboxes to add heavy 
machine gun fire to the torrent 
of mortar and artillery shells. A 
second attack with tanks and 
flame-throwing Crocodiles failed 
to dislodge the stubborn, young 
SS troops and both the Queen’s 
Own and Winnipeg attacks were 
cancelled.
 For the troops in Carpiquet 
the fighting could not be called off. 
Exposed in their finger-like salient 
they were subjected to continuous 
fire from a German mortar brigade 
which was  attached to the 12th 
SS. The Chaudières, defending 
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the south edge of Carpiquet, 
were counterattacked by German 
infantry and Panther tanks. Enemy 
fire was so intense that they could 
not establish a minefield in front 
of their position. Carpiquet had 
become a “true inferno,” but 8th 
Brigade held on for four days until 
“Charnwood” forced the Germans 
to withdraw.
Canadian troops examine a German bunker 
on the airfield at Carpiquet, 12 July 1944.
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Text excerpted from Terry Copp and Mike Bechthold, The Canadian Battlefields in Normandy: A Visitor’s Guide, 3rd Edition (2008).
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Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment by Marc Milner 
is the first to explicitly make the link between 
the southern hangers and escarpment with the 
British operations that were conducted to the 
south.8 
 The battle for Carpiquet was a major event for 
the 3rd Canadian Division and the first brigade-
sized engagement since le Mesnil-Patry almost 
a month previous. The division, in constant 
action since D-Day, had held the line between 
the northern suburbs of Caen and the corps 
boundary near Putot-en-Bessin. The storms of 18 
June that wrecked the Mulberry harbours9 and 
slowed Allied operations also delayed the start 
of Operation Epsom, the British drive over the 
Odon River. The initial assault across the Odon 
was intended to seize Hill 112 and then drive 
southwest to cross the Orne River valley. The 
attack, launched on 25 June, saw the summit of 
Hill 112 change hands several times as elements 
of the 15th Scottish Infantry and the 11th British 
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Above left: Two Churchill tanks from the British 31st Tank Brigade advance south of Norrey-en-Bessin on 27 June 1944 
during Operation Epsom.  Above right: Troops from the British 49th West Riding Division move through Fontenay-le-
Pesnel on 25 June 1944 during Operation Martlett, a small attack designed to clear the startline for Epsom. 
Armoured Divisions battled the II SS Panzer 
Corps. This formation of two divisions, direct 
from the Eastern Front, was drawn into the battle 
to seal off the British penetration.
 For 3rd Canadian Division Operation 
Windsor involved the greater part of the combat 
power available to Major-General Keller at that 
time. Four of his nine infantry battalions and two 
of three armoured regiments were committed as 
well as flail tanks and flamethrowers from 79th 
Armoured Division. The largest fireplan executed 
thus far in the Normandy Campaign supported 
the assault. Fighter-bombers, given an easily 
discernable target in the airfield and environs, 
supported the attack along with over 750 guns 
of the Royal and Royal Canadian Artillery.10 The 
monitors HMS Rodney and Roberts weighed 
in with their six 16-inch and two 15-inch guns 
respectively, joined as well by the nine 6-inch 
guns of the cruiser HMS Belfast. Some have 
criticized Major-General Keller for not being more 
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involved in the conduct of this battle. Starting 
with Lieutenant-General John Crocker, GOC 
I (British) Corps, critics have attacked Major-
General Keller’s lack of grip on the battle and 
his devolution of control of such a large battle 
to a small brigade staff.11 The detailed conduct 
of the battle is outside the scope of this article 
but the result had clear implications for the 
British to the southwest. The partial success at 
Carpiquet, the seizure of the village and northern 
control buildings, but not the southern control 
buildings along the crest, delayed the start of the 
43rd Wessex Division offensive. Brigadier (later 
Major-General) H. Essame, commander of 214th 
Brigade of the 43rd Division, and divisional 
historian, summed up the problem from his 
perspective:
Until the hangers at the south-west corner of 
the aerodrome at Carpiquet were captured, the 
whole area lay in full enemy view. The Canadian 
advance on the 9th put an end to observation 
from the north.12
This view is echoed in a more recent study of 
the Hill 112 battlefield: “Operation Jupiter was 
effectively ‘on call’ as it was predicated on the 
capture of Carpiquet airfield.”13 On 10 July, one 
day after the Canadians had cleared the southern 
control buildings and escarpment, Operation 
Jupiter was launched with four brigades 
assaulting the eastern slopes of Hill 112. The 
larger battle of Caen that still raged through 9-10 
July and the Canadian involvement therein have 
obscured the link to Jupiter. So from where then 
did Operation Windsor originate?
 Operation Windsor grew out of the series of 
Second Army plans for expanding the bridgehead 
Major-General R.F.L. Keller (left), commander 
of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, has been 
roundly criticized for his conduct during 
Operation Windsor, starting with comments 
by his corps commander, Lieutenant-General 
John Crocker (right).
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south and west of Caen amongst which 
the VIII Corps attack west of Caen, 
known as Operation Epsom, was 
critical. Preliminary to that attack were 
several supporting assaults planned by 
XXX Corps and I Corps both east and 
west of Caen. These operations were as 
follows:
Operation Perth – a 51st Highland Division 
operation to expand the bridgehead to the 
west and attract German attention to that 
flank;
Operation Aberlour – a 3rd British Division 
operation, with 9th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade under command, to clear the salient 
north of Caen;
Operation Ottawa – a 3rd Canadian Division 
operation to capture Carpiquet village; and
Operation Martlet – a 49th West Riding 
Division operation that cleared the start 
line for 8 Corps west of Caen in the area of 
Rauray.14
All these operations were planned in the 
period 20-26 June and resulted from General 
Montgomery’s desire to avoid a frontal assault on 
Caen. The lack of potential for expansion to the 
east and the limited success of Epsom resulted 
in the final Operation Charnwood plan that saw I 
Corps launch three divisions directly at Caen on 8 
July. Operation Windsor flowed from these earlier 
operations and was clearly linked more to them 
than to the ultimate assault on Caen. Windsor, 
in its earlier incarnations, first appeared in 
relation to the British offensive on the Odon 
when Operation Aberlour was proposed as a 3rd 
British Division operation to clear the right flank 
of the VIII Corps advance. Operation Aberlour 
was clearly a supporting attack for Epsom as it 
was ordered on 26 June, only one day after the 
start of Epsom15 and long before Montgomery 
issued orders for Operation Charnwood. In 
the original plan Operation Ottawa was also a 
•
•
•
•
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supporting attack for Operation Epsom, as it 
would protect the left flank of the British advance 
by clearing Carpiquet village. At this point the 
VIII Corps attack to the west of Caen was still 
the main effort and the Canadian attack on 
Carpiquet must be seen in this light. Operation 
Aberlour and the subsequent Operation Ottawa 
were successively postponed as the prospects for 
the complete success of Epsom waned. They were 
both eventually called off completely by 28 June.16 
Operation Windsor, as the renamed Operation 
Ottawa was called, was revived in a more “virile” 
form by I (British) Corps on 1 July.17 This still 
predated the order for Operation Charnwood 
received by 3rd Canadian Division on 5 July.18 
To further sever the link between Windsor and 
Charnwood, an explicit order to 3rd Canadian 
Division by I (British) Corps admonished Keller 
not to exploit to the north (towards Caen) if doing 
so would endanger the objectives of Windsor.19 
The objectives of Operation Windsor, the high 
ground to the south of the airfield and the airfield 
and village itself, were more important to I British 
Corps than any benefit that might be accrued by 
the capture of Caen. If the capture of Carpiquet 
was indeed a preliminary to the subsequent 
seizure of Caen then any exploitation to north 
would have aided that effort. The remounting of 
Windsor must also be examined in the context 
of the bitter struggle to seize Hill 112. The initial 
assault by 15th Scottish and 11th Armoured 
Divisions had been reinforced by the arrival of the 
43rd Wessex Division. Their attack was focused 
more to the eastern end of the hill feature and 
the heights on the southern edge of the Carpiquet 
airfield became an even more important vantage 
point for German observers.
 While the study of the documents related to 
Operation Windsor leads to the conclusions I 
have drawn, a far simpler, though perhaps more 
expensive method is available: walk the ground. 
A visit to the Carpiquet battlefield, still in use as 
a commercial short-haul airport, and a careful 
study of the ground should lead the visitor to 
same conclusions reached by Major-General 
Essame in 1952. The key to success at Carpiquet 
was the seizure of the southern control buildings, 
and more importantly the clearing of the crest 
that dominates the ground to the south. A walk 
along that crest in 1998 with Terry Copp and the 
Canadian Battlefields Foundation student study 
tour brought this home in the way no text or map 
could. The southern crest dominates the ground 
to its south, across the Odon valley to crest of Hill 
112. It was along this valley that the 5th Battalion, 
Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry advanced with 
the intent of seizing Verson in concert with the 4 
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July attack. That attack, timed to take advantage 
of Operation Windsor, must not obscure the 
link with the advance planned, in a completely 
different direction, for Operation Jupiter. Further 
to the south of Verson the start line and path of 
advance of the 10 July Operation Jupiter attack 
can be seen clearly. Marc Milner always told 
the students of the tours he led to Normandy 
to consider the ground a primary source when 
studying military history. Nowhere is this more 
clear than at Carpiquet where the contours on 
the map and distance from the southern crest 
to Hill 112 can be deceiving. A powerful set of 
binoculars and a good map were all that any 
German artillery observer would have needed to 
wreck havoc with any British attempt to drive up 
the northern slope of Hill 112.
 The operations of the 3rd Canadian Division 
have been examined and re-examined almost 
since they occurred. Some say that it has been 
studied to death and that Stacey wrote the 
definitive account, so why continue to rake 
the coals of Normandy? The answer lies in 
the evolution of thought about this relatively 
minor battle in the grand campaign. Carpiquet 
teaches us to look beyond the bounds of national 
historiography and examine the context of 
Canadian action within the Allied coalition. A 
simple chronological analysis of events is not 
enough – if Windsor preceded Charnwood then 
Windsor must be a lead in to Charnwood. Rather 
we should expand the “black box” and look at the 
impact of Canadian operations on the activities 
of other formations. Literally getting another 
point of view, by walking the southern crest of 
Carpiquet airfield in this example, helps put the 
decisions and actions of Canadian commanders 
and soldiers in better perspective.
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ALG - Advanced Landing Ground; ELS - Emergency Landing Strip
RRS - Refuelling and Rearming Strip
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